

# Propuesta de curso, Epistemology and General Normativity

Daniel Drucker

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1. Nombre de profesor: Daniel Drucker
2. Nombre de curso: Epistemology and General Normativity (Epistemología y Normatividad General)
3. Campos de conocimiento en los que podría ser anunciado: Epistemología y Ética
4. Breve descripción del curso: La epistemología es una disciplina normativa. Este seminario se ocupa de la relación entre epistemología y otras disciplinas normativas, en especial la teoría de la decisión y la ética. Nos ocuparemos principalmente de preguntas como:
  - ¿Qué ventajas, si hay alguna, tiene la epistemología formal sobre la epistemología tradicional?
  - ¿Deberíamos aceptar o rechazar el consecuencialismo epistémico?
  - ¿Cuál es la relación entre la verdad y la racionalidad (epistémica)?

Este curso servirá como una introducción general y asequible a la teoría de la decisión y la epistemología formal, ya que se utilizarán nociones de ambas.

Epistemology is, perhaps *pace* Quine, a normative discipline. This seminar concerns the relation between epistemology and other normative subjects, in particular decision theory and ethics. We will be principally concerned with questions like:

- What, if any, advantages does formal—especially decision-theoretic—epistemology have over traditional epistemology?

- Should we accept or reject epistemic consequentialism?
- What is the relation between truth and (epistemic) rationality?

This course will serve as a general and gentle introduction to decision theory and formal epistemology, since notions from both will be of use.

#### 5. Bibliografia:

- Hansson, “Decision Theory: A Brief Introduction”
- Lewis, “Why Conditionalize?” (Lewis (1999)); Christensen, “Dutch Books Depragmatized” (Christensen (1996))
- Joyce, “Accuracy and Coherence” (Joyce (2009))
- Greaves and Wallace, “Justifying Conditionalization” (Greaves and Wallace (2006)); Schoenfield, “Conditionalization Does Not (in General) Maximize Expected Accuracy” (Schoenfield (forthcoming))
- White, “Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence” (White (2009)); Pettigrew, “Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference” (Pettigrew (2015))

#### 0.1 *From Epistemic Decision Theory to Epistemic Consequentialism*

- Percival and Stalnaker, “Epistemic Consequentialism” (Percival and Stalnaker (2002))<sup>1</sup>
- Berker, “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions” (Berker (2013))
- Greaves, “Epistemic Decision Theory” (Greaves (2013)); Carr, “Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief”
- Konek and Levinstein, “The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory” (Konek and Levinstein (forthcoming)); Blackwell and Drucker, “When Propriety Is Improper”

#### 0.2 *Rationality, Epistemic Rationality*

- Mark Kaplan and Larry Sklar, “Rationality and Truth” (Kaplan and Sklar (1976)); Schoenfield, “Bridging Rationality and Accuracy” (Schoenfield (2015))

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<sup>1</sup> N.B. this is a non-coauthored symposium.

- Kolodny, “Why Be Rational?” (Kolodny (2005))
- Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism” (Feldman and Conee (1985)); Ri-  
nard, “No Exception for Belief”

6. Criterios de evaluación:

Puesto que este es un curso de posgrado, se espera que los estudiantes hagan las lecturas antes de clase y consideren a profundidad los temas y las cuestiones relevantes. Se espera también que los estudiantes se expresen sus opiniones cada semana. Finalmente, los estudiantes escribirán un ensayo comparable a un artículo académico (8000 a 12000 palabras), o tres ensayos más breves (2000 a 4000 palabras).

Given that this is a graduate course, you will be expected to have done all the reading beforehand and thought considerably about it prior to class, including marking any questions you have. You will also be expected to express your opinions freely each week. Finally, you will write as much as a normal journal-length paper (8,000 to 12,000 words), whether divided between multiple assignments or all together in one. Thus, grading:

7. Propuesta de día y horario: Martes y jueves, dos horas, 12 a 14 horas.
8. Sede: IIFs.

## *References*

- Berker, Selim. 2013. “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.” *Philosophical Review* 122:337–393. 2
- Christensen, David. 1996. “Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers.” *Journal of Philosophy* 93:450–479. 2
- Feldman, Richard and Conee, Earl. 1985. “Evidentialism.” *Philosophical Studies* 48:15–34. 3
- Greaves, Hilary. 2013. “Epistemic Decision Theory.” *Mind* 122:915–952. 2
- Greaves, Hilary and Wallace, David. 2006. “Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility.” *Mind* 115:607–632. 2

- Joyce, James M. 2009. "Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief." In Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), *Degrees of Belief*, 263–297. Springer. 2
- Kaplan, Mark and Sklar, Lawrence. 1976. "Rationality and Truth." *Philosophical Studies* 30:197–201. 2
- Kolodny, Niko. 2005. "Why Be Rational?" *Mind* 114:509–563. 3
- Konek, Jason and Levinstein, Ben. forthcoming. "The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory." *Mind* . 2
- Lewis, David. 1999. "Why Conditionalize?" In *Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology*, 403–407. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge. 2
- Percival, Philip and Stalnaker, Robert. 2002. "Epistemic Consequentialism." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 76:121–151+153–168. 2
- Pettigrew, Richard. 2015. "Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 92:35–59. 2
- Schoenfield, Miriam. 2015. "Bridging Rationality and Accuracy." *Journal of Philosophy* 112:633–657. 2
- . forthcoming. "Conditionalization Does Not (in General) Maximize Expected Accuracy." *Mind* . 2
- White, Roger. 2009. "Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence." In Tamar Szabò Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, volume 3, 161–187. Oxford, UK: Oxford. 2