

Propuesta de curso o seminario

1. Nombre del profesor: Martin Glazier
2. Nombre del curso o seminario: Explanation and ground
3. Campos de conocimiento en los que podría ser anunciado (máximo dos):

Metafísica

Filosofía de la Ciencia

4. Breve descripción del curso (temas y objetivos):

Many philosophers now recognize a distinctively metaphysical form of explanation which we might call ‘grounding explanation’. Such explanation, philosophers in this tradition hold, is central to debates over physicalism, over the relation of mind to body, over morality’s place in the world, over the nature of metaphysics, and many others besides. But what is grounding explanation, and what must the world be like in order for it to exist? This course will center on these questions. Among other things, we will ask: can grounding explanation be understood on the model of causal or scientific explanation? Does it track worldly ‘grounding relations’? Does it require laws? Is it unified?

Objetivo general:

Students will understand contemporary debates over grounding explanation.

Objetivos particulares:

Students will

1. understand some major theories of scientific explanation and consider their application to grounding explanation,
2. grasp the notions of ground and grounding explanation and the arguments for their philosophical centrality,
3. compare and contrast grounding and causation,
4. consider methodological questions concerning theoretical posits, and
5. consider what grounding explanation might require of the world.

Temas:

Week 1: The DN account of scientific explanation

Week 2: The causal and unification accounts of scientific explanation

Week 3: The difference-making and pragmatic accounts of scientific explanation

Week 4: Explanatory realism

Week 5: Classic papers on ground

Week 6: Some applications of ground

Week 7: Are all metaphysical explanations grounding explanations?

Week 8: Is ground a strict partial order?

Week 9: Is grounding explanation backed by grounding relations?

Week 10: Is grounding like causation?

Week 11: Laws of metaphysics

Week 12: Is ground unified?

Week 13: Can we have grounding explanation without ground?

Week 14: Is ground real?

5. Bibliografía (obligatoria y complementaria):

Obligatoria:

Audi, P. 2012. Grounding: Toward a theory of the *in-virtue-of* relation. *Journal of Philosophy* 109(12): 685–711.

Bernstein, S. 2016. Grounding is not causation. *Philosophical Perspectives* 30(1): 21–38.

Dasgupta, S. 2016. Metaphysical rationalism. *Noûs* 50(2): 379–418.

Dasgupta, S. 2017. Constitutive explanation. *Philosophical Issues* 27: 74–97.

Fine, K. 2001. The question of realism. *Philosophers' Imprint* 1(1): 1–30.

Fine, K. 2012. Guide to ground. In *Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality*, eds. F. Correia and B. Schnieder. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Glazier, M. 2016. Laws and the completeness of the fundamental. In *Reality Making*, ed. M. Jago. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Glazier, M. Forthcoming. Essentialist explanation. *Philosophical Studies*.

Hempel, C. G. and Oppenheim, P. 1948. Studies in the logic of explanation. *Philosophy of Science* 15(2): 135–175.

Jansson, L. 2017. Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence. *Erkenntnis* 82: 17–44.

Jenkins, C. 2011. Is metaphysical dependence irreflexive? *Monist* 94(2): 267– 76.

Kim, J. 1994. Explanatory knowledge and metaphysical dependence. *Philosophical Issues* 5: 51–69.

Kitcher, P. 1981. Explanatory unification. *Philosophy of Science* 48(4): 507–531.

Kment, B. 2014. *Modality and Explanatory Reasoning*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Koslicki, K. 2015. The coarse-grainedness of grounding. In *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*, eds. K. Bennett and D. W. Zimmerman, Volume 9. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Koslicki, K. 2016. Where grounding and causation part ways: Comments on Schaffer. *Philosophical Studies* 173: 101–112.

Kovacs, D. M. 2017. Grounding and the argument from explanatoriness. *Philosophical Studies* 174: 2927–2952.

Lewis, D. 1986. Causal explanation. In *Philosophical Papers*, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Litland, J. E. 2013. On some counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding. *Essays in Philosophy* 14(1): 19–32.

Miller, K. and Norton, J. Forthcoming. A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation. *Synthese*.

Raven, M. J. 2013. Is ground a strict partial order? *American Philosophical Quarterly* 50(2): 193–201.

Raven, M. J. 2015. Ground. *Philosophy Compass* 10(5): 322–333.

Rosen, G. 2010. Metaphysical dependence: Grounding and reduction. In *Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology*, eds. B. Hale and A. Hoffmann. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rosen, G. 2017. Ground by law. *Philosophical Issues*: 279–301.

Ruben, D.-H. 1990. *Explaining Explanation*. London: Routledge.

Salmon, W. C. 1989. *Four Decades of Scientific Explanation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Schaffer, J. 2009. On what grounds what. In *Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology*, eds. D. J. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schaffer, J. 2012. Grounding, transitivity, and contrastivity. In *Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality*, eds. F. Correia and B. Schnieder. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Schaffer, J. 2016. Grounding in the image of causation. *Philosophical Studies* 173: 49–100.

Schaffer, J. 2017. Laws for metaphysical explanation. *Philosophical Issues* 27: 302–321.

Shaheen, J. L. 2017. The causal metaphor account of metaphysical explanation. *Philosophical Studies* 174: 553–578.

Strevens, M. 2004. The causal and unification approaches to explanation unified—causally. *Noûs* 38(1): 154–176.

Strevens, M. 2006. Scientific explanation. In *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2nd ed.), ed. D. M. Borchert. Macmillan Reference USA.

Taylor, E. 2017. Against explanatory realism. *Philosophical Studies*.

Thompson, N. 2016. Grounding and metaphysical explanation. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 116(3): 395–402.

Trogon, K. Forthcoming. Grounding-mechanical explanation. *Philosophical Studies*.

van Fraassen, B. C. 1988. The pragmatic theory of explanation. In *Theories of Explanation*, ed. J. C. Pitt. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wilsch, T. 2015. The deductive-nomological account of metaphysical explanation. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 94(1): 1–23.

Wilson, A. 2017. Metaphysical causation. *Noûs*.

Wilson, J. 2014. No work for a theory of grounding. *Inquiry* 57(5-6): 535–579.

Complementaria:

Achinstein, P. 1984. The pragmatic character of explanation. *Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association* 1984: 275–292.

Berker, S. Forthcoming. The unity of grounding. *Mind*.

Dasgupta, S. 2014. The possibility of physicalism. *Journal of Philosophy* 111(9): 557–592.

Fine, K. 2016. Identity criteria and ground. *Philosophical Studies* 173(1): 1–19.

Friedman, M. 1974. Explanation and scientific understanding. *Journal of Philosophy* 71(1): 5–19.

Hofweber, T. 2009. Ambitious, yet modest, metaphysics. In *Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology*, eds. D. J. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kim, J. 1988. Explanatory realism, causal realism, and explanatory exclusion. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 12: 225–239.

Leary, S. 2017. Non-naturalism and normative necessities. In *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, ed. R. Shafer-Landau, Volume 12. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lewis, D. 1973. Causation. *Journal of Philosophy* 70(17): 556–567.

Ney, A. 2016. Grounding in the philosophy of mind: A defense. In *Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground*, eds. K. Aizawa and C. Gillett. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Raven, M. J. 2012. In defence of ground. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 90(4): 687–701.

Schaffer, J. 2010. Monism: The priority of the whole. *Philosophical Review* 119(1): 31–76.

Schaffer, J. 2016. Ground rules: Lessons from Wilson. In *Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground*, eds. K. Aizawa and C. Gillett. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Shumener, E. 2017. The metaphysics of identity: Is identity fundamental? *Philosophy Compass* 12(1): 1–13.

Strevens, M. 2008. *Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Wilson, J. 2016. The unity and priority arguments for grounding. In *Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground*, eds. K. Aizawa and C. Gillett. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Woodward, J. 2017. Scientific explanation. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2017 ed.), ed. E. N. Zalta. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.

6. Criterios de evaluación:

Students will be assessed on the basis of class presentations and a seminar paper. The language of instruction and evaluation is English.

7. Propuesta de día y horario:

Thursdays 3 – 7 pm

8. Sede: IIFs