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Miguel Ángel Sebastián González

Semblanza:

Miguel Angel Sebastián es investigador Titular A del Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas de la UNAM. Su área de especialidad es filosofía de la mente y ciencia cognitiva con gran interés en cuestiones relacionadas con metafísica, filosofía del lenguaje y estética. Su investigación se centra en estudio de la consciencia y en el carácter subjetivo de la misma.

Entidad de adscripción: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas

Página web: https://mindingthebrain.wordpress.com/
Correo electrónico: msebastian@gmail.com

Campos de conocimiento

  • Filosofía de las ciencias cognitivas

Líneas de investigación

  • Filosofía de la mente

Publicaciones recientes

Investigación:

  • Sebastián & Artiga (2018) Informational Theories of Content and Mental Representation. *Review in Philosophy and Psychology.*
  • Sebastián (2018) Embodied Appearance Properties and Subjectivity. *Adaptative Behaviour*.
  • Sebastián (2018d) Teorías de la Consciencia. Enciclopedia SEFA de Filosofía Analítica.
  • Sebastián (2018c) Consciencia. Enciclopedia. Enciclopedia SEFA de Filosofía Analítica.
  • Sebastián (2018b) Drop it like it’s HOT: a vicious regress for higher-order theories. *Phil. Studies*
  • Sebastián (2018a) Access, Phenomenology and Sorites. *Ratio*
  • Sebastián & Artiga (2017) Can Informational Theories Account for Metarepresentation? *Topoi*
  • Sebastián (2017d) “Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo (consciente e inconscientemente) sin saber que las creo”. *Crítica.*Vol. 49(146):37-60
  • Sebastián (2017c) “On a confusion about which intuitions to trust: from the hard problem to a not easy one”. *Topoi *Vol.36(1), 31-40
  • Sebastian (2017b) “Los sueños y el estudio científico de la consciencia” en Diaz, Jimenez and Mueller (eds.), *La naturaleza de los sueños.* Herder
  • Sebastián (2017a) “Functions and mental representation: the theoretical role of representations and its real nature” *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science.* 16(2):317-336.
  • Sebastián (2016b) “Cognitive Access and Cognitive Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Issues” *Philosophical Explorations **19(2): 188-204**. *Reprinted in Jorba, M. & Moran, D. (2018) *Conscious Thinking and Cognitive Phenomenology. *Routledge (ISBN: 978-0-8153-5907-4)
  • Sebastián (2016a) “Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a common theory?” *Theoria *Volume 31, pp.73- 89.
  • Sebastián & Okón (2016a) “How to (Back Up or) Refute (certain) Quantum Theories of Consciousness” *Mind and Matte*r Vol. 14(1), pp. 25–42
  • Sebastián & Okón (2016b) “Rejoinder to Filk” *Mind and Matte*r Vol. 14(1), p. 49
  • Sebastián (2015a) “What Panpsychists should reject. On the incompatibility of Panpsychism and Organizational Invariantism” *Philosophical Studies, *Volume 172, Issue 7, pp 1833-1846
  • Sebastián (2015b) “Borderline experiences one cannot undergo” *Crítica, *Vol. 47, Issue 140: 31-42
  • Sebastián & Sanchez (2015) “Attention Alters Appearances and Solves the ’Many-Many Problem’: Implications for Research in Skill Acquisition and Execution”. *European Journal of Human Movement*, Vol. 34:156-179.
  • Sebastián (2014a) “Dreams an Empirical way to settle the discussion between cognitive and non- cognitive theories of consciousness”*. Synthese, *Vol. 191, Issue 2: 263-285
  • Sebastián (2012/2014b) “Experiential Awareness: Do you Prefer It to Me?” *Philosophical Topics, *Vol 40. N° 2: 155-177
  • Sebastián (2014c) “Not a HOT dream” In R. Brown (ed.). Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Studies in Brain and Mind. Springer Press. ISBN 978-94-007-6001-1
  • Sebastián (2014d) “There is nothing HOT in our dreams: reply to Ivanowich and Weisberg” In R. Brown (ed.). *Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience*. Studies in Brain and Mind. Springer Press. ISBN 978-94-007-6001-1